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ABSTRACT 
 
Traditionally, economics has had a strong influence on marketing theory. 
The emergence of service-dominant logic (S-D logic) has challenged this 
position, based on a seemingly fundamental disagreement about the 
determination and meaning of value. This paper questions the basis of 
this disagreement and concludes that it is possible to reconcile the 
meaning of value in S-D logic and economics under the condition of 
scarce resources.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
According to Vargo & Lusch (2004:1), “Marketing inherited a model of 
exchange from economics, which had a dominant logic based on the 
exchange of “goods,” which usually are manufactured output.” They label 
this model goods-dominant logic (G-D logic). The early contributions to 
S-D logic include discussions about the differences between S-D logic 
and G-D logic regarding the determination and meaning of value. Vargo 
& Lusch (2004:7) state that in S-D logic “Value is perceived and 
determined by the customer on the basis of “value-in-use”.”  This is 
compared to G-D logic where “Value is determined by the producer. It is 
embedded in the operand resource (good) and is defined in terms of 
“exchange-value’” Vargo & Lusch (2004:7). Vargo and Morgan (2005) 
discuss G-D logic in depth and trace the role of goods and services 
through economic history. They observe that some early economists, 
among them Bastiat ([1860] 1996), described a service-centred model of 
exchange, but that this service-centred model was abstracted away 
through the development of economic science and replaced by a goods-
centred model, i.e. G-D logic, focusing on value-in-exchange. “With utility 
as an economic unit of analysis, the issue of use value could be ignored; 
value-in-use had been transformed into an embodied property, 
essentially equivalent to value in exchange” (Vargo & Morgan 2005:45).  
 
Robbins (1945:16) gives a frequently quoted definition of economics: 
“Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between given ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses.” Economic theory is deduced from a series of 
postulates. According to Robbins (ibid.:78-79), the main postulate of 
economic value theory “... is the fact that individuals can arrange their 
preferences in an order, and in fact do so.” This postulate is applicable 
whenever resources are scarce, that is when they are limited in relation 
to human needs for them. Marketing, on the other hand, is defined by the 
American Association of Marketing as “... the activity, set of institutions, 
and processes for creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging 
offerings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society at 
large.” According to the definition of economics, the activities and 
processes of marketing are a subject matter of economics inasmuch as 
they involve the use of scarce resources. Marketing can never be 
reduced to a matter of economics, but economics is usually considered 
to be an aspect of marketing. S-D logic could therefore benefit from an 
extended understanding of the determination and meaning of value in 
economics.  
 
The purpose of present paper is to extend the understanding of S-D logic 
by applying economic theory. After a brief review of how value-in-use and 
value-in-exchange are understood in S-D logic, the determination and 
meaning of value is discussed from the perspective of economic theory. 
Finally, the understanding of value-in-use and value-in-exchange in S-D 
logic is discussed in relation to economic theory.  
 
DETERMINATION AND MEANING OF VALUE IN S-D LOGIC 
 
Vargo and Lusch (2004) reopened the discussion of the nature of value 
based on the perspectives of G-D logic and S-D logic. Liberation from 
concepts associated with traditional G-D logic has been important in the 
process of constructing a conceptual framework for S-D logic. In G-D 
logic, value is created in the firm’s production process and becomes 
thereby embedded in goods and measured as value-in-exchange. One of 
the implications of S-D logic for marketing theory is that it shifts the focus 
from value-in-exchange to value-in-use. According to S-D logic, the value 
of a service is always uniquely and phenomenologically determined by 
the customer. The firm cannot deliver value to its customers; it can only 
make value propositions (Vargo & Lusch 2008a). Vargo and Lusch 
(2008b:31) explain that “... since service is defined in terms of customer-
defined benefit, it is necessarily aligned with value-in-use... Value-in-
exchange remains important but it is primarily derived from value-in-use 
and, like goods, plays an indirect role in value-creation.”  
 
Value is related to utility, but the meaning of utility is ambiguous, and so 
is its relationship to value-in-use and value-in-exchange.  Vargo & Lush 
(2006:48) note that “The term utility has two meanings. The first relates 
to usefulness, the ability to derive benefit from something.... Utility, as it is 
more frequently used in marketing, derives from economic science and, 
though its original meaning was tied to usefulness, the term has morphed 
to a connotation, if not a denotation, of an embedded property of matter.” 
Vargo and Lusch (2008b:30) indicate that utility is an expression of value: 
“... the early scholastics (sic) recognized that value-in-use was a higher 
order concept than exchange value... But in the subsequent development 
of economic science, value (utility) became to be understood in terms of 
value-in-exchange.”  
 
DETERMINATION AND MEANING OF VALUE IN ECONOMICS 
 
Vargo & Morgan (2005) explain that there were two perspectives on 
economic activity by the end of the nineteenth century, a service-centred 
model and a goods-centred model. They argue that that the goods-
centred paradigm survived and that “... the service-centred model... 
became a footnote in economic science” (ibid.:46). The literature on S-D 
logic leaves us with the impression that G-D logic at some stage became 
inherent to economic theory. In the present paper it is suggested that the 
goods-centred model rests with the classical economists and that the 
service-centred model was carried forward by their successors (although 
some economists, both scholars and practitioners, may have 
underappreciated this). 
 
With regard to classical economics, the connection between G-D logic 
and economic theory is quite obvious. Adam Smith ([1776]2001) and 
other classical economists were concerned with creation of national 
wealth through production of manufactured goods. Within this context 
they made a distinction between productive labour and unproductive 
labour. Productive labour produced manufactured goods, all other labour 
efforts were unproductive. The value of a product was determined by the 
relative input of labour (later extended to also other kinds of factor inputs) 
needed in their production. In this way, value became embedded in the 
product.  
 
The next generation of economists dismissed the labour theory of value 
and shifted economic theory to a more service-centred path. Menger 
([1871]2007) focused on the ability of goods to satisfy human needs. 
Jevons ([1871]1957) and Walras ([1874-77]1954) argued that the value 
of a good was dependent on the utility experienced by the consumer and 
not the inputs to the production process. Jevons credits Dupuit (1849) 
with the first perfect comprehension of the theory of utility: “In attempting 
to frame a precise nature of the utility of public works, he [Dupuit] 
observed that the utility of a commodity not only varies immensely from 
one individual to another, but that it is also widely different for the same 
person according to circumstances” Jevons ([1871]1957:xxviii). From this 
point value was no longer considered embedded in products. With 
Jevons ([1871]1957), Menger ([1871]2007) and Walras ([1874-77]1954) 
came the breakthrough for the marginalistic approach in economic 
theory. They made a distinction between (total) utility and marginal utility. 
Marginal utility is the change in (total) utility caused by the consumption 
of one more unit of a good. Jevons and Walras believed that both (total) 
utility and marginal utility was, at least in principal, measurable and that 
utility could be a subjective measure of happiness. Menger ([1871]2007), 
on the other hand, focused on the relative importance of goods in 
satisfying human needs and did not believe in an absolute measure.  
 
Later economists acknowledged the futility of claiming that one object is 
twice as useful as another. A view similar to Menger’s (ibid.) was adopted 
and the idea of measurability of utility was abandoned. If utility wasn’t 
measurable, then marginal utility wasn’t measurable either. Pareto 
([1909]1972) and later Hicks and Allan (1934) developed a theory relying 
only on the postulate that an individual is capable of ordering various 
situations or experiences according to their importance to him. Utility was 
now merely a way of describing the preferences of the individual. In 
comparing two different experiences, the individual will either judge the 
two experiences to be of equal importance, the first to be more important 
than the second or the second to be more important than the first. 
Whether these experiences are connected to a physical good or not is of 
no importance. They suggested that we could get an expression of how 
an individual values experience A in relation to experience B by 
considering how many units of A are needed to compensate for the loss 
of one unit of B. Contemporary consumer theory rests on this foundation 
and the exposition in today’s textbooks is very similar to the one of Hicks 
and Allan (ibid.).  
 
Smith ([1776]2001:48) distinguished between value-in-use and value-in-
exchange in his much quoted passage: “The things which have the 
greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and, 
on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have 
frequently little or no value in use.”  At the same time, he introduced the 
paradox of water and diamonds: water has a high use value, but a low 
exchange value - diamonds have low use value, but high exchange 
value. The paradox of the value of diamonds and water was later 
resolved by Jevons ([1871]1957), Menger ([1871]2007) and Walras 
([1874-77]1954), independently of each other. The crucial point was the 
concept of marginal utility. They explained that although the utility of 
water is high, in normal situations the marginal utility of water is zero 
because water is abundant relative to the demand for water. Diamonds 
may have lower utility than water, but they are scarce relative to demand 
and their marginal utility is therefore high.  From this, it is evident that 
utility and value are different concepts. Value is a relationship, expressed 
by Menger ([1871]2007:120) in this manner: “The value of a good arises 
from their relationship to our needs, and is not inherent in the goods 
themselves. With changes in this relationship, value arises and 
disappears. ... Value is thus nothing inherent in goods, no property of 
them, nor an independent thing existing by itself.”  A non-economic good 
is distinguished from an economic good in that the former is abundant 
and the latter is scarce. A non-economic good possesses utility only, 
whereas an economic good possesses both utility and use value. 
Confusion in this respect had, according to Menger, been an obstacle to 
the development of economic science, but “At no time has an 
economizing individual attributed value under ordinary circumstances to 
a cubic foot of air or, in regions abounding in springs, to a pint of water. 
The practical man distinguishes very well between the capacity of an 
object to satisfy ones needs from its value” (ibid.:119).  
 
Menger ([1871]2007:228) explained the difference between use value 
and exchange value like this; “Use value...is the importance that goods 
acquire for us because they directly assure us the satisfaction of needs 
that would not be provided for if we did not have the goods at our 
command. Exchange value is the importance that goods acquire for us 
because their possession assures the same result indirectly.”  Value-in-
exchange arises in the market as goods actually undergo exchange.  
Only goods that have value-in-use in the above mentioned sense are 
exchangeable.  A good would lose its exchange value with respect to 
another good if the other good became useless. The first good would, 
however, still be scarce and useful (Walras [1874-77]1954). Price and 
value-in-use will be the criteria employed by the customer when 
considering engaging in an exchange of goods.  An individual will pay for 
a good as long as value-in-use exceeds the value-in-exchange. 
According to (Mill [1848]2001:504), “The exchange value of a thing may 
fall short, to any amount, of its value in use; but that it can ever exceed 
the value in use, implies a contradiction; it supposes that persons will 
give, to possess a thing, more than the utmost value which they 
themselves put upon it as a means of gratifying their inclinations.”  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
From the above review, there seem to be a few points that represent 
potential dissonance between S-D logic and economics. These points 
are 1) who creates value, 2) the understanding of value-in-use and 3) the 
relative importance of value-in-use and value-in-exchange.  
 
S-D logic emphasises that value is uniquely and phenomenologically 
determined by the consumer. We have seen that early economists 
believed that value was added in the production process, but that in 
contemporary economic theory, value is subjective and based on the 
fundamental assumption that the individual is able to rank experiences in 
order of importance to him. Value can therefore not be embedded in a 
product. There seems to be no contradiction between S-D logic and 
economic theory at this point. There is no denying that many economists 
have taken, and some probably still do take, the perspective of G-D logic.  
Nevertheless, economic theory generally embraces the perspective of S-
D logic at this point.   
 
The discussion on the understanding of value-in-use is a bit more subtle 
and we may start with the ambiguous meaning of utility. Vargo and Lusch 
(Vargo & Lusch 2006:48) consider utility in the sense of “...usefulness or 
a benefit derived from something...” compatible with S-D logic. Vargo and 
Lusch (2008b) state that the customer-defined benefit of a service is 
“aligned with value-in-use”.  One possible interpretation of this is that 
they consider utility equivalent to value-in-use.  We saw earlier that 
Menger ([1871]2007) made a distinction between utility and use value.  
According to Menger, utility can be experienced regardless of    scarcity. 
Value-in-use, on the other hand, is a concept relevant only to situations 
involving scarcity. It appears that if S-D logic is interpreted within the 
context of scarcity, the understanding of value-in-use will be consistent 
with that concept in economics. The interesting question is then whether 
the perspective of S-D logic is limited to situations where resources are 
scarce. The literature on S-D logic does not seem to give an explicit 
answer to this. On the other hand, Vargo and Lusch (2004) and Vargo 
and Morgan (2005) find support in the economic theory of Bastiat, who 
touches on the issue of scarcity when he concludes that “... value must 
have reference to the efforts made by men in order to secure the 
satisfaction of their wants” (Bastiat [1860] 1996:5.12).  
 
Vargo and Lusch (2008b) note that in S-D logic, value-in-exchange is 
derived from value-in-use. This corresponds well to Walras ([1874-
77]1954), who states that only goods that have value-in-use will have 
value-in-exchange, i.e. value-in-use is regarded as a prerequisite for 
value-in-exchange. Value-in-exchange will then be a function of value-in-
use in the sense that circumstances that increase value-in-use also will 
tend to increase value-in-exchange. The reason is that the customer’s 
willingness to pay for a product increases with value-in-use. A supplier 
will have an incentive to increase his engagement in customer practises 
and contribute to increased value-in-use for his customers, as long as his 
reward exceeds the opportunity cost of his efforts.  According to the 
literature on S-D logic, economics focuses on value-in-exchange, 
whereas S-D logic focuses on value-in-use.  In actual fact, both concepts 
remain relevant to both disciplines.  The issue might be interpreted as a 
matter of means and ends; where value-in-use is an end in S-D logic but 
a mean in economics and value-in-exchange is an end in economics.  
Widespread support for this interpretation seems to be lacking in 
economic theory.  One would be tempted to regard value-in-use as the 
end and exchange as a means to this end. The consumer aims to 
maximise the difference between value-in-use and value-in-exchange. 
The producer wishes to maximise the difference between value-in-
exchange and opportunity cost (the value of foregone alternatives due to 
resources being tied up elsewhere).  Ultimately, this means that the end 
is to maximise the difference between value-in-use and opportunity cost. 
Again, there appears to be no contradiction between S-D logic and 
economics, providing that we operate within the context of scarce 
resources.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has examined the nature of the disparity between S-D logic 
and economics in understanding the determination and meaning of 
value. The conclusion is that if the scope of S-D logic is limited to 
situations with scarce resources, there seems to be no contradiction 
between the fundamentals of economic theory and the perspective of S-
D logic.   
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